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Abstract 
When taking into account time, services can experience similar 
productivity gains as manufacturing. Motion pictures constituted the first 
technology that industrialized a labour-intensive service. Measuring output 
in time spent consuming them doubles output growth from 4.2 to as much 
as 9 percent per annum, accounting for 2 percent of U.S. GDP-growth 
between 1900 and 1938. Pure productivity growth caused 60 percent of 
this, their growing GDP-share 24 percent, and input transfers and physical 
capital each 8 percent. Falling ticket prices and rising opportunity costs 
kept the full-cost per spectator-hour constant, suggesting that the surge in 
demand was caused by rising full incomes and entertainment’s high 
income elasticity. Imploding prices limited the pictures’ expenditure share 
and made the economic impact go largely unnoticed.  
 
 
So long as the number of persons who can be reached by a 
human voice is strictly limited, it is not very likely that any 
singer will make an advance on the £10,000 said to have been 
earned in a season by Mrs. Billington at the beginning of the 
last century, nearly as great as that which the business leaders 
of the present generation have made on the last. 
Alfred Marshall1
 
 
When Charlie Chaplin was nineteen years old he appeared in three 
music halls a night. On one fine day he started in the late afternoon at the 
half empty Streatham Empire in London. Directly after the show he and 
his company were rushed by private bus to the Canterbury Music Hall 
and then on to the Tivoli (Chaplin, 1964; Ehrlich, 1986). This constituted 
the maximum number of venues an entertainer could visit on an evening, 
and thus the inherent limit to a performer’s productivity. Yet, barely five 
                                                 
1 1947: 685-686; as quoted in Rosen (1981). 
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years had passed and every night Chaplin would appear in thousands of 
venues across the world at the same time. His productivity had increased 
almost unimaginably. He himself was able to capture only a small part of 
this efficiency increase, but yet this tiny percentage made him the world’s 
highest-paid performer.2
 Chaplin’s experience epitomizes the massive increase in 
productivity modern service technologies have made possible. These 
efficiency gains often came as a thief in the night because inputs such as 
labour or capital have been used as output proxies, and because sharply 
falling prices kept expenditure shares modest even as quantities 
skyrocketed. What was widely noticed - in the entertainment industry at 
least - was the sharp increase in stars’ income, even though these 
reflected only a limited part of the efficiency gains that the new technology 
brought about. 
For services, output measurement has been a heavily debated 
issue.3 Valuing entertainment output by the time spent using it, for 
example, increases output growth threefold relative to conventional 
measures.4 Gary Becker (1965: 507), when discussing differences 
between manufacturing and services notes: “Service industries like 
retailing, transportation, education and health, use a good deal of the time 
of households that never enter into input, output and price series, or 
therefore into measures of productivity. Incorporation of such time into the 
series and consideration of changes in its productivity would contribute, I 
believe, to an understanding of the apparent differences in productivity 
advance between these sectors.” 
                                                 
2 Chaplin’s weekly pay increased from $150 at Keystone in 1913, to $1,250 at Essanay 
in 1914, to $10,000 at Mutual in 1916, to about $13,000 at First National in 1918 
[Kindem, 1982: 82-83]. 
3 For examples see Barzel (1974); Griliches (1992); Triplett and Bosworth (2004), 
Berndt and Hulten (2007). 
4 The approach follows Goolsbee and Klenow (2006), who reach similar conclusions for 
internet-access services. For a general analysis of time allocation dynamics between 
1965 and 2005, see Krueger (2007). 
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Motion pictures can be seen as new (capital) goods that, when 
used with a projector, delivered a service to consumers. The 
entertainment industry was one of the first services to become 
industrialized and therefore may be significant for understanding 
productivity growth in other service industries.5 Performances were 
automated, standardized and made tradable, resulting in rapid market 
integration and massive output growth (Bakker, 2001). Moving images 
replaced actors, floor managers, musicians and stage hands. This 
industrialization may have been not unlike the way in which information 
and communication technology (ICT) would automate, standardize and 
make tradable certain services after 1945 (Freeman and Soete, 1997: 
403-408). The sharp growth in the quantity consumed per capita 
(eighteen times between 1900 and 1938) was partially hidden by a sharp 
fall in prices, keeping the expenditure share of entertainment relatively 
low and making the industrialization relatively unnoticed. 
This paper analyses the impact of cinema technology on the 
productivity of the spectator entertainment industry and on economic 
growth between 1900 and 1938. It shows that when output is valued by 
the time spent consuming entertainment, using the ‘spectator-hour’ as a 
measure, output and productivity growth were several times higher than 
conventionally measured. In 1938, for example, entertainment as share of 
consumers’ leisure time was 5 times that of its expenditure share. The 
paper uses growth accounting to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth, quantifies the impact on the economy and compares this to that 
of what some have called general purpose technologies (GPTs) (Crafts 
and Mills, 2005; Lipsey et al., 1998). 
                                                 
5 The term industrialization of services has been coined before, for example by Levitt 
(1976, 1983), although in a slightly different context. See also Bakker (2001) and 
Broadberry (2006). 
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This paper differs in three key aspects from Baumol and Bowen’s 
(1966) work on stagnating productivity in the performing arts.  First, it 
assumes that all spectator entertainment is part of the same market, 
irrespective of the delivery technology, whether live actors or projected 
images. Although they acknowledge the massive productivity increase 
enabled by audiovisual technologies, Baumol and Bowen assumed that 
the ‘performing arts’ formed an entirely different market. This was 
probably less accurate before 1940, when cinema and live entertainment 
were engaged in a competitive struggle, than in the 1960s, when the 
surviving live entertainment—either heavily subsidized (e.g. avant garde 
plays) or high-value added (e.g. Broadway musicals)—was far more 
differentiated, and that was precisely how it survived. Second, while 
Baumol and Bowen studied performing arts such as symphony orchestras 
and theatre, this paper includes popular entertainment such as vaudeville 
and burlesque, which were rather important before 1940. Third, the 
current paper uses a real output measure, the ‘spectator-hour’, rather 
than input proxies, such as the person-hours a string quartet uses to 
perform. The latter per definition underestimates productivity growth, 
because it disregards the spectator-hours the quartet could sell through 
audiovisual technologies. 
This paper has three key findings. First of all, when measured in 
spectator-hours, entertainment’s output growth in the early twentieth 
century - nine percent annually - was at least two to three times larger 
than conventionally measured. Most of this was hidden by a massive fall 
in prices because of sharp TFP-growth of over five percent per annum, 
higher than that of most other new activities during the period (Field, 
2003) and far higher than conventional estimates, which average minus 
0.3 percent annually.  
Second, spectator entertainment had a not insignificant impact on 
national economic growth. It accounted for almost two percent of GDP-
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growth and more than three percent of national TFP growth between 
1900 and 1938. This was somewhat lower than, but not unlike that of 
other new activities at the time. Third, 60 percent of its contribution was 
caused by pure productivity growth, 24 percent by its increasing GDP-
share and 8 percent each by input transfers and capital growth. Fourth, 
falling ticket prices and rising opportunity costs kept the full-cost per 
spectator-hour constant, suggesting that the surge in demand was not 
caused by falling full costs, but by rising full incomes combined with the 
high income elasticity of entertainment. 
 The implications of these findings are, first, that certain service 
industries are not per definition stagnant, but, in the face of market forces, 
can adopt new technologies and potentially be subject to similar or even 
higher productivity growth than in agriculture and manufacturing. Second, 
inadequate output measurement may leave a substantial part of this 
growth unmeasured, and the current productivity estimates may therefore 
understate both national productivity growth as a whole as well as the 
part due to certain services. Angus Maddison (2001: 138), for example, 
showed how the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ use of an annual chain 
index and of hedonic indices to adjust for quality changes resulted in an 
upward revision of U.S. economic growth by a third, from 2.63 to 3.48 
percent per annum between 1929 and 1950. The current paper suggests 
that we still are understating the wealth the twentieth century has brought 
us, and that improved measurement of service output may lead to 
significant further upward revisions. 
 The remainder is organized as follows: Section I sketches the 
historical background, and discusses measurement methods. Section II 
and III discuss data and measurement. Section IV uses a Solow model to 
estimate TFP-growth in quantities and prices, and changes in mark-ups. 
The next section assesses the contribution to GDP-growth. Section VI 
compares the results with those for GPTs. Section VII concludes. 
 5
I.  Historical Background
During the nineteenth century stand-alone entertainment venues 
made way for theatre circuits and local stock companies for travelling 
companies, helped by the railways. Central booking offices on Union 
Square in New York routed creative inputs efficiently across the nation. 
Innovations such as the steel frame and reinforced concrete enabled a 
sharp increase in theatre size as well as price differentiation, with cheaper 
tickets for the galleries. On the demand side, falling working hours, rising 
disposable income, urbanization, rapidly expanding transport networks 
and strong population growth boosted consumption of entertainment.  
At the turn of the century, when the existing industry faced 
decreasing returns to further process innovations, cinema was adopted. It 
industrialized live entertainment by automating it, standardizing it and 
making it tradable (Bakker, 2001). Actors needed only to make one 
performance, which was reproduced infinitely. This standardized the 
public’s viewing experience; they were guaranteed they would see the 
entertainment as advertised, without understudies, second-rank sets, 
reduced musical support or actors having a bad night. Before cinema, only 
creative inputs were mobile and relatively permanent in time, now the 
performances themselves became tradable. They were not produced 
anymore at the time and place of consumption, usually one of the 
characteristics of a service. Tradability increased competition among 
creative inputs for the audience’s attention and integrated entertainment 
markets. 
Until the emergence of cinema, the number of actors and actresses 
per 100,000 inhabitants increased sharply (figure 1). It stagnated 
subsequently, while real revenue per performer increased sharply. Between 
c. 1905 and 1917, prices for film increased while demand grew rapidly 
(Gomery, 1992), suggesting substitution. Films were often interspersed 
with live entertainment or vice versa. Particular good data for Boston in 
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1909 (Jowett, 1974) show that local consumers could chose between at 
least eight forms of theatrical entertainment, ranging from opera at a $2 
ticket price to moving pictures at ten cents (figure 2). These figures form a 
static, early snapshot of a dynamic process of creative destruction. Three 
years after their emergence, cinemas supplied half of Boston’s capacity. 
Given the low prices, however, it took in only a sixth of expenditure. The 
rapid diffusion was reflected in the increasing price elasticity of demand at 
lower prices, as tentatively suggested by the evidence (table 1). The 
cheapest vaudeville reacted by interspersing live performances with films. 
The radical new technology not only swept away the traditional 
entertainment delivery technology, but also opened up new markets, 
supplying consumers that had never seen theatrical entertainment before. 
Gradually, cinema would automate away more and more lower-priced live 
entertainment, leaving standing only the most differentiated and 
expensive forms. 
In the late 1920s sound films constituted a major jump in 
substitutability by automating away most of the remaining live acts.6 
Before their introduction, Americans spent $1.33 per capita on theatre, 
versus $3.59 on movies, while in 1938 the figures were $0.45 vs. $5.11 
(figure 3). Theatre historians note how motion pictures increasingly 
became a substitute for live entertainment (Moore, 1968). Jack Poggi 
(1968: 79, 43), for example, writes: 
 
First the movies created a new audience, many of whom had 
never been to the theatre; but the desertion of the galleries in 
theatres in all the large cities indicates that they also began to 
lure away that part of the theatre audience with the lowest 
income. Then, as the movies improved in quality and 
respectability, people from the business and professional 
                                                 
6 Kraft (1994a, 1994b) and Ehrlich (1986: 197-210) analyze talkies’ disastrous effect on 
musicians’ employment for the US and Britain. Ehrlich discusses one-person cinema 
organs (replacing whole orchestras) as an important labour-saving innovation before 
the coming of sound. 
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classes might be expected to change their entertainment 
habits. (...) Possibly the habitual New York theatregoers went 
to both theatre and films for a time and then gradually limited 
their attendance at live theatre to special occasions. This 
theory would explain why the less popular plays began closing 
more quickly, causing a drop in the number of theatre weeks. 
(...) 
  The motion pictures could not have crushed the legitimate 
theatre if there had been a real preference for live drama. 
Theatre managers would never have turned their buildings 
over to the movies if they could have made more money by 
booking plays; a few might have been satisfied if there had 
been equal profit, or even a little less, in live theatre. Again we 
come back to the same point: people were simply not willing to 
pay the price necessary to maintain live theatre, except in the 
largest cities. If they could get what they wanted from the 
movies, why should they look elsewhere? 
 
Production data (figure 3) suggest a process of creative destruction, 
in which spectator entertainment became industrialized in two stages: 
from the mid-1900s onwards, cinema automated away small-town live 
entertainment (proxied by ‘road productions’) and from 1927 talking 
pictures creatively destroyed the high-value-added metropolitan 
entertainment (proxied by ‘Broadway’). 
During this process industry and market definition changed. 
Sometimes final-year industry/market definitions are used to show that 
the new high-productivity service served an entirely different market. 
Initially film and live entertainment were close substitutes with high cross-
price elasticities, but over time, the surviving live entertainment became 
more and more differentiated from film. It was either heavily subsidized or 
a commercial metropolitan premium product. Given the available 
evidence, this paper will treat live entertainment as the best substitute for 
film. 
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II.  Measuring Output
Services play an essential part in understanding long-run economic 
growth and development. Stephen Broadberry (1997, 2006) and 
Broadberry and Ghosal (2002), for example, note how demand patterns 
shifted in favour to services as incomes rose, and how the superior 
productivity performance of the United States vis-à-vis Europe can be 
explained mainly by its productivity lead in services, which had been 
previously overlooked because of the difficulty to measure services 
output. 
A related problem is how to measure the contribution of new goods 
to productivity growth and economic welfare. Several studies deal with 
this by measuring the services that these good delivers. William 
Nordhaus (1997), for example, focused on the services that light bulbs 
and other devices have provide since Babylonian times, concluding that 
the consumer price index severely understates their price decrease. 
Walter Oi (1997) examined the welfare effect of air conditioners, and 
others those of products such as mobile phones, minivans and apple-
cinnamon breakfast Cheerios (Hausman 1997a, b; Petrin 1997). 
Assessing the historical contribution of new goods, J. Bradford DeLong 
(2000) concludes that ‘no previous era and no previous economy has 
seen anything like the level of material wealth and productive potential 
attained by the twentieth century’s economy.’ DeLong argues that we 
take this for granted because we have come to expect progress. 
To proxy output growth in services, often employment or capital is 
used. As these are inputs, this inevitably leads to observing limited TFP-
growth.7 This paper uses a common measure for output for both live and 
filmed entertainment, the ‘spectator-hour’. Not unlike passenger-miles, 
the seats in a venue times the performance duration constitute the 
                                                 
7 The TFP-figures below show capital is a better proxy than labour growth, as Millward 
(1990) suggested, although far from perfect. 
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spectator-hours produced, the proportion filled the hours actually sold. 
Valuing a service by the time spent using it seems justified, given the 
large amount of time consumers spent on spectator entertainment relative 
to its expenditure share. In 1900 the share of leisure time and wages 
spent on entertainment were roughly equal, but by 1938 the former was 
five times the latter (table 2). Intuitively, this suggests a substantial 
welfare increase that is not fully captured in GDP-estimates.8
An additional reason for using time to measure output is the ‘third 
person criterion’, often used in household satellite accounts that 
supplement national accounts (Murgatroyd and Neuburger 1997; Reid 
1934). If an activity can not be delegated to a third person (going to the 
dentist, hairdresser, listening to music, etc.), it is considered household 
consumption. If it can be, it is household production. Activities such as 
childcare, cooking and doing the laundry can be produced in the market 
in different ways and at different prices, which can be compared to 
household production. Consumptive activities like cinema-going do not 
have a delegation option. The only way other activities can compete is for 
the time they involve. This suggests that time is the most fundamental 
output of the entertainment sector, and therefore a useful way to value its 
output. 
Between 1900 and 1938 the labour hours needed to pay for one 
hour of entertainment decreased substantially, from over two hours to 
about ten minutes. At the same time opportunity costs started to dominate 
monetary costs, increasing from 31 to 88 percent of full costs.9 The price 
                                                 
8 The approach here follows Goolsbee and Klenow (2006), who apply it to the internet, 
and reach similar conclusions for that service. For a general analysis of the dynamics 
time allocation between 1965 and 2005, see Krueger (2007). 
9 We assume opportunity costs equalled the wage rate, also for the unemployed, 
following Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), who estimate leisure time in the 1930s. 
Alternatively, the unemployed could have opportunity costs proportionate to 
unemployment duration, following, for example, Layard (1981) and Crafts (1987). The 
unemployed then needed low prices because they had little income, the employed 
because their opportunity costs were so high. Assuming linear proportions and a 26-
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decrease and wage increase balanced each other out so that the full cost 
to the consumer remained unchanged (table 2).10 At the aggregate level, 
if we value output by the hours spent using it, growth was 9.2 percent and 
TFP-growth 5.9 percent annually (table 3).11 If we value output by its price 
relative to all other goods and services, growth was just 4.2 percent and 
TFP-growth 0.9 percent annually. If we value output by opportunity costs, 
growth was as much as 12.3 percent and TFP-growth 9.0 percent. If we 
sum the last two measures, to value output by its full cost, we get an 
output and TFP growth that is similar to weighing the output in spectator-
hours, because the effect of price falls and wage rises cancelled each 
other out. The surge in opportunity costs may have driven the implosion 
in prices, as venues needed to keep full costs low to keep drawing 
customers.12 The remaining puzzle is how consumption could increase 
with 7.6 percent per capita per annum, given that the full cost of one 
spectator-hour remained constant. 
Becker (1965) notes how during the first half of the twentieth 
century the productivity of both labour and leisure increased. The 
increasing productivity of leisure led people to change labour into leisure 
hours (substitution), or vice versa (the income effect).13 Likewise, rising 
labour productivity (and thus rising wages) would lead to changing leisure 
for labour hours (substitution) and labour for leisure hours (the income 
                                                                                                                                               
week average duration, and taking the unemployment rates of 5 percent and 12.47 
percent for 1900 and 1938 (Barber 1976), our findings hardly change: opportunity-cost 
output- and TFP growth (table 3, line 3) decline by 0.12 and 0.10, and total-costs 
output- and TFP growth both by 0.14 percentage points. The ratio of total consumption 
costs for the employed to those for the unemployed then increased from 1.25 to 8.8 
between 1900 and 1938. Valuing everyone’s leisure hours at a different proportion of 
wages obviously only affects total-costs growth rates. Valuing leisure time at half the 
wage rate, for example, reduces output- and TFP growth from 9.2 to 6.9 and from 5.9 
to 3.6 percent. 
10 Following Becker (1965) ‘full costs’ is used rather than ‘total costs’ to emphasize they 
include opportunity costs and relate to ‘full income’. 
11 The TFP-growth accounting is explained in section IV. 
12 An example of a cost-reducing innovation is the cinema-organ mentioned above.  
13 Owen (1970) notes substantially falling prices of leisure goods and services as 
evidence of rising productivity of leisure time. 
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effect). If both productivities increased at the same rate, which Becker 
suggests was likely, then the respective substitution and income effects 
cancelled each other out. With an income elasticity of time-intensive 
activities greater than unity, however, labour hours fall and leisure hours 
rise, and this is what happened in the early twentieth century, according 
to Becker. So the story is not simply one of increasing labour productivity 
with the income effect dominating a substitution effect, but of the effects 
of labour and leisure productivity growth offsetting each other, with at the 
higher full income a larger demand for time-intensive activities. 
The historical evidence indeed suggests a sharp increase of both 
market and household productivity, even if both cannot always be 
measured perfectly (Owen 1970). Moreover, the income elasticity of time-
intensive activities was high in this period. Bakker (2007), for example, 
finds an income elasticity for motion pictures of 2.3 in 1918 and 1.5 in 
1935, and for live entertainment of 4.4 and 8.2 respectively.14 Mincer 
(1963) and Becker (1965) note that these income elasticities would be 
higher still if the full costs were taken into account, since opportunity costs 
increase with income.  
 The constant full cost of a spectator-hour suggests that Becker’s 
conjecture held for the case of spectator entertainment. The effect of an 
increase in productivity of leisure time (the falling price per spectator-
hour) was off-set by the increase in labour productivity (rising real wages). 
Thus, entertainment demand per capita did not increase because of 
falling ticket prices, but because rising leisure and labour productivity 
increased full income, which led to more expenditure on entertainment, as 
its income elasticity was far above unity. 
                                                 
14 In 1889-1890 the income elasticity of ‘amusements and vacations’ ranged between 
1.2 and 1.4 for families with positive expenditure and was 2.1 for all families. Estimates 
for Britain and France reach similar or higher elasticities (Bakker 2007). 
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 With constant full costs, any per capita consumption increase 
between 1900 and 1938 must have been due to the long-run full-income 
elasticity of demand. Using the wage rate to reflect the change in full 
income, we get a long-run full-income elasticity of demand of 3.96.15
 Historical evidence suggests that in an earlier place and time - 
during the British Industrial Revolution - on the contrary, leisure 
productivity increased sharply while labour productivity remained 
stagnant, and that the income effect dominated the substitution effect 
(Voth 2000). When their full income increased because of more 
productive leisure, consumers chose to spend more hours labouring. 
In the case of entertainment, the income and substitution offsets 
can be observed so clearly because it was time-intensive at the extreme: 
consumption involved a fixed, chunky amount of time, few other activities 
could be done simultaneously, and hardly any goods were used by the 
consumer. The compensation of falling prices by rising opportunity costs 
is not inconsistent with Becker’s (1993: 386) observation that the day’s 
24-hour limit forever prevents us from reaching a cornucopian Utopia: 
Economic and medical progress have greatly increased length 
of life, but not the physical flow of time itself, which always 
restricts everyone to 24 hours per day. So while goods and 
services have expanded enormously in rich countries, the total 
time available to consume has not. Thus wants remain unsatis-
fied in rich countries as well as in poor ones. For while the 
growing abundance of goods may reduce the value of 
additional goods, time becomes more valuable as goods 
become more abundant. The welfare of people cannot be 
improved in a utopia in which everyone's needs are fully 
satisfied, but the constant flow of time makes such a utopia 
impossible. 
                                                 
15 This is substantially higher than estimates not taking into account opportunity costs / 
full income. Bakker (2001), for example, finds a long-run GDP-elasticity of demand for 
entertainment of 2.32 for this period, which is an upper bound to long-run income 
elasticity, as GDP grew faster than per capita income and the price decrease was 
ignored. Intertemporal elasticities are different from cross-sectional elasticities, 
naturally. 
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The above does not take into account changes in the quality of a 
spectator-hour. Given the massive increase in production expenditures 
and new product characteristics - such as cinema itself, the feature film, 
talking pictures, air-conditioned venues - quality change was probably 
positive.16 Robert Lamson (1970), for example, studied the quality of 
motion picture theatres between 1947 and 1964, including dimensions 
such as crowding, parking spaces, and theatre age. Quality change was 
substantial and not captured in the national accounts; it would lower the 
admission price series with about two-thirds, and increase total factor 
productivity from zero to 2.7 percent. This suggests that the current 
paper’s assumptions understate actual productivity growth. 
 
 
III.  Data
Spectator entertainment is defined as theatrical entertainment such 
as opera, theatre, concerts, vaudeville, burlesque and cinema. Two 
benchmark years have been selected for the growth estimate: 1900, the 
first census year before cinema’s take-off, and 1938, when the 
industrialization was complete. Since 1927 sound had driven out most live 
entertainment, and television had still to arrive.17 Reliable and exact data 
sources could not be obtained easily. Especially for 1900, sometimes 
estimates had to be made based on indirect indicators. Appendices A and 
B explain each estimate in detail.18 Yet, we do not need to quantify 
everything perfectly to make the point that the entertainment’s impact on 
                                                 
16 Initially, pictures’ lack of audience-interaction and sound were inferior characteristics. 
Live entertainers provided both aspects during and between pictures, before the 
talkies. 
17 The other major new media - recorded music and radio - were partially different 
products. The phonograph had remained an elite product. Although in the 1920s radio 
expanded rapidly, it would only reach its peak during the 1940s and early 1950s. 
Choosing 1938 makes the estimates more conservative because motion picture and 
live entertainment expenditure grew rapidly from 1940 onwards. 
18 These are attached and also available from the authors. 
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GDP-growth was substantial. Following Fogel’s (1964) approach, we bias 
our estimates against the idea that entertainment’s growth contribution 
was large. If we then still find a significant growth contribution, data 
imperfections are unlikely to change our findings. It is not our aim to get 
the exact value of entertainment’s contribution, something that is hardly 
possible given data imperfections, but merely to show that given the 
available evidence, its impact must have been big. 
For the primal growth accounting, data on the capital stock, the 
labour quantity and output (in spectator-hours) have been collected. 
Labour quantity is measured in hours using industry full-time employment 
estimates linked with data on national average working hours from 
Huberman and Minns (2007). Labour quality has been proxied by the 
average number of years of education for the population from Maddison 
(1995). For dual growth accounting, prices and factor prices have been 
estimated. The 1900 estimates are based on the census, the Historical 
Statistics of the United States (U.S. Department of Commerce 1975), a 
household expenditure survey, Owen (1970), and on studies in theatre 
and film history. No reliable industry wage data were available; the 
national average has been used. Capital is GDP-deflated and other 
values are deflated by the consumer price index to make them 
comparable with 1938. 
 The data for 1938 is slightly more reliable, as most estimates are 
based on the National Income and Product Accounts, supplemented by 
data from industry studies such as Greenwald (1950) and Conant (1960). 
Wage data were only available for film and ‘amusements and recreation’. 
Combined with other sources, the latter only gives an indication of live 
entertainment wages. An upper bound estimate of accumulated welfare 
benefits, using Fogel’s (1964) social savings method, was made with (the 
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more reliable) 1938 data only.19 It is a good test to assess whether the 
TFP-estimates are in the right ballpark. 
 
 
IV.  The Growth in Total Factor Productivity 
Traditional growth accounting captures the contribution of 
technological change to growth through the Solow residual (TFP). With 
the standard Cobb-Douglas production function and competitive 
assumptions: 
αα −= 1LAKY         (1) 
the Solow residual is computed as: 
L
Ls
K
Ks
Y
Y
A
A
lk
∆−∆−∆=∆       (2) 
With Y = output (in spectator-hours), K = capital, L = labour, A = the Solow residual, 
and sk and sl are the factor income shares. 
 
A term for changes in labour quality has been added in table 4. At 
nine percent annually for almost forty years, output growth was 
remarkably high.20 A third was explained by increases in capital and 
labour, the rest was due to TFP-growth. Growing over five percent 
annually, the latter was significantly higher than in other industries.21  
                                                 
19 Social savings estimate the cost-savings of a new technology compared with the 
next-best alternative: 
aac qppSS )( −=  
Where pc is the price of the next best alternative (live entertainment), pa the actual price 
at the current technology, and qa the actual quantity consumed.  Assuming the actual 
quantity remains unchanged at the counterfactual price yields the upper bound. The 
advantage compared to TFP is that only final-year (1938) data is needed. 
20 For the estimation of factor elasticities, value of human capital and the effect of 
international trade, see Appendix A. 
21 See section VI. 
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 Using the average share of motion pictures in all spectator 
entertainment, it is possible to disaggregate total TFP-growth into the 
contribution of live and film technology:22
film
livelivefilmlive
film s
gsg
g
−= +       (3) 
Where g denotes the annual average growth rate between 1900 and 1938 and s the 
share of the respective technology in output. 
 
Live entertainment showed substantial negative output growth of 
1.24 percent annually (table 4). However, inputs where shrinking far 
faster than output, mainly driven by an exodus of the labour force, 
resulting in moderately positive TFP-growth.23 Cinema output grew 
thirteen percent annually, sixty percent of it driven by TFP-growth. By 
1938 it was 13 times as productive as live entertainment. 
The Solow residual can also be computed as 
LK
LKs
LY
LY
A
A
k /
)/(
/
)/( ∆−∆=∆       (4)  
This shows entertainment labour productivity increasing with 7.5 percent 
per annum (table 5). Only slightly more than a tenth was explained by 
capital deepening, and slightly more by increased education of the 
workforce. Live labour productivity grew 2.3 percent annually, largely 
driven by capital deepening and increased education of the work force, 
while film labour productivity grew over nine percent annually, mostly 
                                                 
22 This assumes that live technology accounted for all output, because Nickelodeons 
emerged only in 1905 and film TFP-growth is extremely sensitive to imprecisions in a 
1900 size estimate. Live’s share was 0.263, the geometric average of the assumed 
1900 (1) and 1938 share. Interpolating geometrically from benchmark estimates for 
1909, 1914, 1919, 1921, and so on, using US Department of Commerce (1975), 
combined with industry growth indicators (Bakker, 2005: 344-347) yields an 0.224 
share. To keep the TFP-growth estimate for cinema technology conservative, the 
higher live share is used. 
23 Increasing efficiency in a declining technology is not unusual. Utterback (1996), for 
example, shows gas lighting’s efficiency improved remarkably, and prices fell 
concurrently, when faced with electric light competition. 
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because of TFP-growth. In 1900, one hour of labour produced 1.3 
spectator-hours, by 1938 this had increased to 19.5 hours.24
By 1938, the industry level of TFP was over eight times what it had 
been in 1900, and for the film industry alone it was over seventeen times 
as much. The changes in the industry production structure were 
significant. The industry doubled the capital/labour ratio (figure 4). Even 
the declining live entertainment’s ratio was only a fifth lower than that of 
cinema by 1938 (table 6). The capital/output ratio declined sharply, from 
$0.71 to $0.15 per spectator-hour.25 The technical rate of substitution at 
least doubled. By 1938, about $16,000 of capital was needed to replace 
one worker.26
Although the underlying Cobb-Douglas function is probably not a 
perfect model of actual production, sensitivity tests comparing the 
wage/rental ratio, factor costs and income shares with their Cobb-
Douglas values suggest that it is a good approximation in this case.27  
A dual method to estimate of TFP growth was used Zvi Griliches 
and Jorgenson (1967) and has been applied to economic history by 
Antras and Voth (2003) and Crafts (2003). The decline in price of a good, 
all factor prices remaining the same, must be the result of an increase in 
efficiency. The dual highlights the welfare interpretation of TFP through 
real cost reduction (Hulten 2001, Harberger 1998), including 
unconventional benefits. The dual of expression (2) thus becomes: 
                                                 
24 Arrived at by multiplying Y/L (table 3) with the average years of education (6.38 in 
1900, 10.03 by 1938). The increase was driven by both rising labour and leisure 
productivity, as reflected in rising real wages and falling ticket prices. 
25 This is partially responsible for the large ‘shift-effect’ (input transfer effect), discussed 
in section IIIc. 
26 Arrived at by taking 1756 hours * 10.03 years of education * 0.90 (the TRS). 
27 Using: 
L
K
r
wTRS α
α−== 1 ; w
K
L
TRS
wr α
α
−== 1 ; rL
KTRSrw α
α−=⋅= 1 ;
wLrK
rK
+=α  
Wage/rental ratios for total, live and film varied between 1.02 to 1.15 of the CD TRS. 
Actual rental rates were between 1.03 to 1.21 of CD-rates, and actual wages 1.03 to 
1.15 of CD-wages. 
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The results are more tentative than for primal TFP, because rough 
estimates had to be made for wages and rentals in 1900.28 Most 
productivity gains were passed on to consumers: real prices fell 
phenomenally, with over four percent per annum for nearly forty years, 
before television had even arrived (table 7). Because live entertainment 
prices fell by ‘only’ 1.3 percent annually, film technology had the largest 
downward force on prices, decreasing them with about six percent per 
annum over almost forty years.29 The dual estimates give confidence that 
our TFP-estimates are in the right ballpark. 
 
 
V.  The Impact on Aggregate Economic Growth and Productivity
Entertainment’s growth contribution can be calculated following 
traditional growth accounting (Crafts, 2004a). Multiplying the growth of 
capital by entertainment’s profit share, we arrive at the extensive 
contribution, which was very small (table 8). The intensive growth 
                                                 
28 See Appendix B. Sensitivity tests comparing estimated wages or rentals with those 
of the Cobb-Douglas production function, show that the dual results for total and film 
TFP are not very sensitive, but that dual live TFP and all markups are sensitive to small 
estimation errors. 
29 The difference between primal and dual TFP-growth should reflect changes in 
markups (Crafts and Mills, 2005) using:  
( tdualprimalt
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−+= )       
 (6) 
Where P and MC denote price and marginal cost, and g denotes primal or dual TFP-
growth as a fraction. Although markups are very sensitive to estimation imprecisions, 
our data suggests they did not increase, and probably declined (table 7). Thus, 
dynamic efficiency did not happen at the expense of allocative efficiency in the long 
run, consistent with Nordhaus’ (2004) findings for US industries between 1948 and 
2001. 
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contribution, that is producing more outputs without increasing any inputs, 
consists of three effects.30 The pure productivity effect captures 
entertainment’s contribution if its GDP-share had remained the same; it is 
the 1900 share times TFP-growth.31 The share effect captures the 
contribution caused by increased relative spending on entertainment. It is 
TFP-growth times the average additional GDP-share. The input transfer, 
or ‘shift’, effect, takes into account that inputs were used more efficiently 
in entertainment than elsewhere; it is the growth of inputs times the 
difference between entertainment’s GDP-share and input-share. 
It turns out that 1.87 percent of GDP-growth can be explained by 
entertainment.32 This growth contribution was large compared to the 
industry’s size. It was 2.5 times its average GDP-share and over two-
thirds of steam’s intensive contribution in Britain between 1870 and 1910 
(Crafts, 2004a). Only eight percent of entertainment’s contribution was 
due to extensive growth (embodied in new capital), sixty percent to pure 
productivity, a quarter to the share effect and as much as seven percent 
to the input transfer effect. Entertainment’s growth contribution was 
achieved almost without adding new inputs. 
Motion pictures’ share of aggregate TFP-growth, therefore, was 
even larger (table 9).33 It amounted to as much as three percent of TFP-
growth, over five times its GDP-share. Another way of reassuring 
                                                 
30 Nordhaus (2002), who names the share effect the Baumol effect and the shift effect 
the Denison effect. 
31 Entertainment’s expenditure share in GDP is its so-called Domar weight. Economy-
wide these weights sum to greater than 1. For an algebraic justification see Hulten 
(1978). 
32 An alternative method, dividing GDP in entertainment and a composite good and 
then correcting entertainment prices, suggests entertainment accounted for 1.59 
percent of GDP-growth, slightly less (possibly because it is innocent of the shift effect) 
but still in the same ballpark, suggesting our findings are not unreasonable. 
33 Angus Maddison (1995: 255). For the U.S. private non-farm economy Field (2003) 
finds a growth rate of 1.70, Abramovitz and David (1999) 1.40 and Gordon (2000) 1.43 
percent per annum. Rates for various intervals were converted into 1900-1938 
equivalents, using weighted geometric averages. Maddison’s estimate is used because 
it encompasses the whole economy. Other estimates leave entertainment-TFP-growth 
still several times general TFP-growth. 
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ourselves that there is a real welfare gain is to use the concept of social 
savings popularized in the economic history literature following Fogel 
(1964). This is simply the difference in the resource cost of supplying a 
given volume of output using old and new versions of the technology. The 
previous section showed how TFP-growth can be interpreted as the rate 
of real cost reduction. Social savings from reductions in the cost of 
spectator entertainment as a proportion of GDP can therefore give an 
upper bound estimate of the welfare gains of real cost reduction.34
Motion pictures’ social savings in 1938 relative to a world where 
they did not exist are obtained by taking all film spectator hours produced 
(7 billion) times the price difference with live entertainment. These turn 
out to be almost $2 billion, or 2.2 percent of 1938 GDP. Being an upper 
bound estimate, this is slightly higher than the accumulated TFP-growth 
(real cost reduction) between 1900-1938, giving confidence that our 
growth accounting results are not unreasonable. 
 
 
VI.  Discussion
Comparing this paper’s findings with existing growth data on 
recreation suggests that our current understanding of GDP-growth in this 
period may seriously underestimate the contribution of certain services. 
Existing pre-1929 GDP series are based on benchmark-year estimates, 
which do not include entertainment separately before 1909. Using the 
price relative to all other goods and services, however, combined with the 
expenditure for 1900 and 1938 yields an output growth of 4.2 percent and 
                                                 
34 The upper bound arises because the technique in its simplest form, used by Fogel 
(1964), assumes that demand is inelastic, and thus that consumers keep consuming 
the same quantity at old technology prices. Social savings are innocent of international 
trade, but motion picture exports were small compared to domestic expenditure (see 
Appendix A) and cannot materially alter our findings. The TFP/social savings 
comparison follow Crafts (2004a: 344-345). 
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a price increase of 1.4 percent annually, and a TFP growth of 0.90 
percent (table 10). 
From 1929 onwards the national accounts contain price indices for 
live and filmed entertainment.  If we link them to our 1938 estimates, and 
then weigh the output by price rather than spectator-hours (the method 
traditionally applied), this reveals an annual output decline of -0.47 
percent per annum between 1929 and 1938. If we assume that the 
growth of inputs calculated for 1900-1938 was not much different during 
the 1930s, this yields a negative TFP-growth of -3.76 percent. If we use 
the NIPA indexes to estimate the number of spectator hours for 1929 and 
then value output by those, output grows with 0.15 percent, and TFP is 
still sharply negative. Even if input growth would have been a fraction of 
the 1900-1938 trend rate, TFP-growth would still be negative. In short, the 
national accounts underestimate entertainment’s growth contribution. 
We can also compare motion pictures to Lebergott’s (1996) growth 
estimates for all recreation services, which amount to 4.2 percent 
annually for 1900-1938, yielding TFP-growth of 1 percent. If we combine 
Lebergott’s price series for 1900-1929 with entertainment’s share in 
recreation services and our output and price data, all recreation services 
grew with just 0.16 percent per annum, and their price with 13.7 percent 
per annum. Both are highly improbable and suggest entertainment is 
currently not well-measured. Detailed estimates by Owen (1970) for all 
recreation services as well as goods between 1901 and 1938 show an 
output growth of 4.3 percent annually. If spectator entertainment output 
grew at the same rate, TFP would have been just one percent. 
On average, the above existing estimates imply output, price and 
TFP growth of 3, 0.2 and -0.33 percent per annum, respectively (table 
10). They underestimate output growth by at worst minus 5 percent and 
at best 58 percent of that measured in this paper, leading to an 
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underestimate of TFP-growth of at worst minus 63 percent and at best 35 
percent of actual TFP-growth.  
No well-measured industry surpassed entertainment’s TFP-growth 
during the first half of the twentieth century (table 11). Only rubber 
products and electric utilities came close, with 10 and 13 percent lower 
TFP-growth. If we compare other industries’ thirty-year intervals with 
entertainment’s 38-year, only rubber exceeded entertainment’s TFP-
growth by nine percent. If we take twenty and ten year intervals, more 
industries surpass entertainment, showing that its TFP-growth was not 
unheard of, but that no other industry experienced it for so long. Over 
shorter intervals, entertainment TFP-growth was in the same league as 
transport, electricity and their supply sectors oil and gas and rubber, but 
its growth contribution lower because sharply falling prices, together with 
low exports and a demand elasticity bounded by the 24-hour day, kept its 
GDP-share lower. Motion pictures thus led the big league in TFP-growth, 
but lagged in impact because of its small GDP-share. 
The fact that entertainment accounted for about 3 percent of over-
all TFP-growth suggests that it was part of the broad-based U.S. shift to 
accelerated TFP-growth, and of the TFP-surge outside manufacturing 
during the 1930s identified by Field (2003, 2006). Compared to TFP-
growth in other service industries, motion pictures remained exceptional. 
TFP-growth, for example, was ‘only’ 1.8 percent per annum between 
1919 and 1938 in the telephone industry, 3.9 percent in electric utilities 
and 2.2 percent for the railroads (Kendrick, 1961).35
High TFP-growth has been associated with General Purpose 
Technologies (GPTs), ‘a technology that initially has much scope for 
improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many 
                                                 
35 Derived from 1919-1929 and 1929-1941 intervals. Only ‘Trucking and warehousing’ 
and ‘Transportation by air’ had higher TFP-growths than film (13.6 and 13.7 percent 
annually) for 1929-1941 (Field, 2006: 219).   
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uses, and to have many Hicksian and technological complementarities’ 
(Lipsey, 1998; Crafts, 2004a). GPT’s initial productivity impact is typically 
minimal; it may take 40 to 120 years to become substantial. Film 
technology possessed some GPT-properties: initially it needed many 
improvements and became widely used nationally and internationally, in 
almost every town. Motion pictures probably had their largest productivity 
impact only after thirty to forty years, with the coming of sound in 1927. 
Their uses, however, as well as complementarities, remained largely 
constrained to spectator entertainment, and this limited their growth 
impact compared to GPTs. 
Entertainment’s GDP-share was much lower than that of GPTs, 
except early British steamships (table 12). Yet its TFP-growth and 
intensive growth share were higher than most other GPTs. Only fin-de-
siècle British railways experienced growth more intensively, and only 
because passenger time savings have been included in output (Leunig 
2006). Because of its small size, cinema’s total growth contribution was 
smaller than that of GPTs. 
Its accumulated intensive growth contribution was in the same 
ballpark as many GPTs and higher than British railways, steam and 
steamships before 1870 (table 12).36 The high contribution was possible 
because the extreme intensiveness of growth compensated for 
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Where Gt = the ‘growth impact’, the accumulated intensive growth as fraction of GDP, 
sy = the share of spectator entertainment expenditure in GDP and t = the number of 
years. This is a formalization of the methodology used by Crafts (2004b) and Foreman-
Peck (1991). 
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entertainment’s small expenditure share. Without the plunge in prices 
resulting from the efficiency increase, this share might have been far 
higher. 
To assess an industry’s growth impact, its accumulated growth 
contribution (real cost reduction) can be expressed as a fraction of the 
national accumulated intensive growth (using expression (7)) (Table 12, 
column 12). The latter was 37 percent of GDP in 1938 relative to 1900. 
Using only technologies available in 1900, the US would have needed 
additional inputs to the value of a third of actual GDP to produce the 
same output. A technology’s share in national real cost reduction can 
potentially quantify the extent to which it is a GPT. This growth impact 
assessment takes account of both intensive growth and industry size and 
scales this to economy-wide efficiency gains. Motion pictures accounted 
for 3.8 percent of national real cost reduction, a growth impact lower than 
that of any GPT except early British steamships because of 
entertainment’s low GDP-share and high national intensive growth during 
its emergence.37
 
 
VII.  Conclusion
During the early twentieth century, spectator entertainment 
experienced a phenomenal output growth hidden by a massive fall in 
prices, driven by a TFP-growth of over five percent per annum for forty 
years. Spectator-hours consumed per capita increased seventeen fold, 
real prices fell by 5/6th and the ratio of leisure time share to expenditure 
share increased fivefold.  
                                                 
37 If national intensive growth was the average of that during the emergence of other 
GPTs, entertainment’s growth impact would be 7.3 percent. If its GDP-share equalled 
the GPT-average, its growth impact would be 11.1 percent. Combined, the impact 
would be 16.4 percent, lower only than ICT and British railways before 1870. (National 
intensive growth, GDP-share and the joint effect account for 28, 59 and 13 percent of 
growth, respectively). 
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 The implications of these findings are that certain service industries 
are not per definition stagnant, but, in the face of market forces, can 
potentially be subject to similar or even higher productivity growth than 
agriculture and manufacturing.38 Inadequate output measurement may 
hide a substantial part of this growth. Empirical evidence corroborates 
Becker’s (1965) hypothesis that much of the productivity difference 
between the production of goods and services disappears once we 
include time in our output valuation. Measured by the time spent watching 
them, motion pictures made a substantial contribution to the general 
surge in TFP-growth in services identified by Field (2003; 2006) for the 
interwar period, and this surge may therefore have been even higher.  
The proper weighing of time is particularly important for time-using 
activities, time-saving technological change and technological change 
that leads to quality of life outcomes (i.e. that extends time at the ultimate 
extensive margin). The concept of output is essential to measure 
productivity performance in services, both publicly and privately provided 
services, and should be measured in terms of its incremental contribution 
to total welfare (Atkinson 2004: 44). One could get misleading measures 
of economic welfare if one does not take into account better outcomes. At 
the micro-level everybody accepts these as benefits, but at the macro 
level they are often not considered. Time-savings of new highways, for 
example, are routinely compiled at the micro-level before they are built, 
but do not show up in national accounts (Fernald 1999). 
The railways’ contribution to economic welfare between 1850 and 
1912, for example, as measured by their social savings, was over three 
times as high if we factor in the opportunity-costs of travel time (Leunig 
2006). Likewise, conventionally measured, the contribution of medical 
                                                 
38 See also Lee’s (1994) historical overview of British services. Lee concludes that 
services’ poor productivity performance in a particular period ‘was not an eternal 
constant, to be built into grim forecasts of the end of growth’. 
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services to overall productivity growth seems negligible at best, but when 
changes in outcomes are examined, it could be substantial. William 
Nordhaus (2005: 386) finds that between 1900 and 1950 the value of 
improvements in life expectancy where substantially above the increase 
in the value of all other goods and services put together, and Cutler and 
Richardson (1997), find that between 1970 and 1990 the increase in 
quality-adjusted health capital per capita was about five times the 
increase in medical spending per capita. Frech and Miller (1999) show 
that doubling drug expenditure at age 40 increases life expectancy by two 
percent (about a third of the effect of doubling GDP), implying again that 
the output achieved with healthcare inputs may not be properly reflected 
in national accounts. These studies suggest that the twentieth century 
has brought us much that has gone unmeasured. 
Contrary to the index case of the eighteenth century textile industry, 
in many of these twentieth century services industrialization came as a 
thief in the night. Exceptional output growth was accompanied by sharply 
falling prices that limited the growth of expenditure shares, by rapid 
industry growth that made the decline in traditional employment more 
relative than absolute, and by a shift to product innovations that obscured 
industry/market definition. Measuring productivity only in the traditional 
sector of these industries often shows a productivity slowdown, but this 
approach is like using the output of the independent village tailor to claim 
that productivity growth in the textile industry has been stagnating since 
1750. Spectator entertainment might be the prime example of a group of 
industrialized services that - although individually different - together have 
sharply increased productivity, output and our welfare over the twentieth 
century. The happenings of the early motion picture industry therefore 
may give insight into the nature of technological change in many service 
industries to come. 
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TABLE 1 
PRICES, CAPACITY, SALES POTENTIAL, ESTIMATED “PRICE ELASTICITY” AND “CONSUMER SURPLUS” FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF THEATRICAL ENTERTAINMENTS, BOSTON, 
1909 
 Price Capacity Sales Percentage of  “Price elasticity of demand”  
Consumer 
surplus CS/Rev. 
  ($) (seats) ($) Capacity Sales  arc informal Log-log  ($) (%) (%) 
Opera 2.00 13,590 27,180 2 10 -2.41 -3.86 -0.30 19,230 17 71 
First-class theatres 1.00 111,568 111,568 14 42 -2.41 -1.45 -0.30 55,784  48 50
Popular theatres 1.00 17,811 17,811 2 7 -0.96 8,906  8 50
Stock houses 0.75 21,756 16,317 3 6 -1.08 -1.42 2,720  2 17
Vaudeville houses 0.50 45,744 22,872 6 9 -0.61 -0.82 -1.42 5,718  5 25
Burlesque houses 0.25 80,700 20,175 10 8 -0.48 -0.96 -1.42 10,088  9 50
Vaudeville and moving pictures 0.15 79,362 11,904 10 4 -0.48 -0.99 -1.42 3,968  3 33
Moving-picture theatres 0.10 402,428 40,243 52 15 -1.76 -1.23 -1.42 10,061  9 25
All above entertainments 0.35 772,959 268,070 100 100 -1.07 -0.53 -0.78 116,473   100 43
   All live entertainment 0.67 330,850 221,875 43 83 -1.17 104,428  90 47
   Motion picture entertainment 0.10 442,109 46,195 57 17 -1.76 12,045  10 26
                          
 
Source - Calculated from data from Boston Committee 1909, as mentioned in Garth S. Jowett, 1974. 
Notes - Capacity = the weekly seating capacity as estimated by the Boston committee (venue capacity times number of performances). 
Sales = sales potential, when all seats are sold at the listed prices.     
Arc elasticity = between respective price and the next price down.     
Informal elasticity = based on best tangents to demand curve at data point, using mixed log-lin, polynomial and power curves at various stretches of 
the demand curve. 
Log-log elasticity = based on constant elasticity log-log model split for two parts of demand curve to get best fit (R2=0.998 and 0.945). 
CS = Consumer surplus = area above price line and under hypothetical demand curve for the respective stretch of the curve. For opera, the intercept 
at q=0 is set at $4.83, the price that equalizes  
“upward and downward” arc elasticity for opera.      
Rev. = Revenue.        
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TABLE 2 
TIME AND MONEY SPENT ON CONSUMING SPECTATOR ENTERTAINMENT AND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES, 1900-1938 
 
1900 
  
1938 
  
1938 
disaggregated 
  (hours) ($) (%)   (hours) ($) (%)  Film Live
Spectator-hours consumed per entertainment 
consumer 9.63       81.32 79.53 1.79
Expenditure per entertainment consumer    
     
     
     
     
 3.46  8.33  7.66 0.67
Share of leisure time used   0.67    3.10  3.03 0.07
Share of wages used   0.73    0.61  0.56 0.05
   Share leisure/share wages 91.30 508.57  540.88 139.23
Hourly wage rate  0.16    0.78   0.78 0.78
Price of one spectator-hour  0.36
 
0.10
 
0.10 0.37
   Hours of work per spectator-hour 2.23 0.13 0.12 0.48
Full costs to consumer  0.52    0.88   0.87 1.15
     in real dollars of 1938  0.88    0.88   0.87 1.15
Opportunity costs / all costs 30.94 88.37  88.99 67.54
One spectator-hour/all weekly leisure time   3.61    1.98    
Price / all weekly expenditure     3.95       0.39  0.37 1.42
 Real annual growth rates, 1900-1938 
       All      Live
One spectator-hour/all weekly leisure time    -1.56       
Real hourly wage rate    2.80       
Real price of one spectator-hour    -4.58      -1.27
Real full cost to consumer    0.00      2.12
Hours of work per spectator-hour       -7.18          -3.96
  
Sources - Wages from Dewhurst, consumer price deflator from Mitchell (1998); entertainment prices and quantities from Appendix B. 
Notes - All values are averages for consumers of spectator entertainment. For 1900 this has been set at 1/3 of the population, for 1938 at 2/3. Most 
findings are insensitive to this assumption as they concern ratios. All dollar values in current dollars, unless otherwise stated. Opportunity costs / all 
cost as indicator of time intensity has been taken from Goolsbee and Klenow (2006).  
Leisure time is total annual hours minus annual working hours from Huberman and Minns (2007) and 365x12 hours for sleep and personal/household 
care.  The findings are not very sensitive to the hours subtracted 
 
TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF OUTPUT VALUATION METHOD ON OBSERVED TFP-GROWTH FOR 
ENTERTAINMENT, 1900-1938 
Valuing output by 
 
Unit 
 
Output  
(million)  
Growth rates 
1900-1938 
    1900 1938  Output TFP
Spectator-hours spectator-hour 249 7,038  9.19 5.90
       
Relative price $ of 1938 151 721  4.19 0.90
Opportunity costs $ of 1938 68 5,479  12.25 8.96
   Full costs $ of 1938 219 6,200  9.19 5.90
 MEMORANDUM 
Price $ of 1938 0.61 0.10  -4.58  
Wage rate $ of 1938 0.27 0.78  2.80  
Full costs  $ of 1938 0.88 0.88  0.00  
      
Sources - Appendices A and B. 
Notes - Relative price = relative to all other prices for consumer goods and services, using 
the CPI.  Opportunity costs = wage rate times spectator-hours. Full costs = adding output 
weighed by price to that weighed by opportunity costs. Growth rates in percent per annum. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUTPUT GROWTH IN SPECTATOR ENTERTAINMENT, 1900-1938,  
PER CENT PER ANNUM 
   TOTAL  DISAGGREGATED 
    
Live 
technology
Film 
technology 
Output  9.19  -1.24 12.86 
      
Contributions     
 Capital  1.22  -0.17  
 Labour quantity  1.17  -2.58  
 Labour quality  0.90  0.90  
      
 All above inputs 3.29  -1.85 5.10 
 TFP  5.90  0.60 7.76 
      
Source - Appendices A and B. 
Note - The contribution of film technology is an estimate based on the total and live 
contribution, using expression (3) from the text. 
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TABLE 5 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN ENTERTAINMENT, 1900-1938, 
PERCENT PER ANNUM 
   TOTAL  DISAGGREGATED 
    
Live 
technology
Film
technology
Labour productivity  7.52  2.27 9.44
      
Contributions     
 Capital deepening  0.82  0.72 0.95
 Labour quality  0.90  0.90 0.90
 TFP  5.79  0.66 7.60
      
Source - Appendices A and B. 
Note - The contribution of film technology is an estimate based on the total and live 
contribution, using expression (3) from the text. 
 
TABLE 6 
KEY PRODUCTION FUNCTION RATIOS FOR THE U.S. ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, 1900 
AND 1938 
Ratio Unit 1900 1938  1938 disaggregated 
           Live Film
Y/L s-h/hour/yedu 0.20 1.95  0.29 2.23
 $/hour/yedu 0.12 0.20  0.11 0.22
K/Y $/s-h  0.71 0.15  0.88 0.14
 $/$  1.16 1.51  2.36 1.43
K/L $/hour/yedu 0.14 0.30  0.26 0.31
TRS $/hour/yedu 0.41 0.90   0.77 0.92
      
Source - Tables 4 and 5; Appendix B. 
Notes - TRS = The technical rate of substitution; s-h = spectator-hour. yedu = average years 
of education of the labour force; 6.38 in 1900 and 10.03 in 1938, as in Maddison (1995). 
Dollars have been deflated to 1938 dollars using the consumer price deflators in Mitchell 
(1998). 
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TABLE 7 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO REAL PRICE DECLINE IN SPECTATOR ENTERTAINMENT, 1900-1938,  
PERCENT PER ANNUM 
  TOTAL  DISAGGREGATED   
      
Live  
technology
Film 
technology 
Real price -4.58  -1.27 -5.74  
     
Contributions    
 Rental -0.18  -0.85   
 Real wage (quality adjusted) 1.83  1.08 1.93  
 Dual TFP 6.23  1.50 7.89  
     
Primal TFP 5.90  0.60 7.76  
    
Markup  -0.33  -0.90  -0.13  
 1938 VALUES (1900 = 100) 
Real price 17  62  16  
        
 Rental 76  27  83  
 Real wage (quality adjusted) 250  172  263  
 TFP-level 883  126  1711  
        
Markup 88  71  95  
      
Sources - Appendices A and B; national wages: unskilled: Williamson (2006); all: USDC 
(1975). 
Notes - Wages and prices deflated with Mitchell's (1998) consumer price deflators, before 
real price and wage growth is computed. Wage growth rate is based on average real wage 
per person-year of education (pyedu). 
For comparison: national real unskilled hourly wages grew by 0.87 percent per pyedu per 
annum, total national hourly wages grew by 0.98 percent per pyedu per annum. The markup 
is calculated using expression (6) in the text. 
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TABLE 8 
GROWTH CONTRIBUTION OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, 1900-1938 
 
Growth Fraction Growth 
contribution
  (% p.a.) (%) (%-point p.a.)
Extensive growth contribution    
  Growth capital 4.90    
  Profits/GDP  0.07   
     Total extensive growth contribution   0.003
     
Intensive growth contribution     
  Growth TFP 5.90    
  Output/GDP in 1900  0.44   
    Pure productivity effect   0.026  
  Average additional output/GDP 1900-1938  0.18   
    Share effect   0.011  
  Growth of inputs 3.29    
   Average input share in GDP 1900-1938  0.30   
     Input transfer effect   0.003  
Total intensive growth contribution   0.039 0.039
      
Total growth contribution    0.043
     
Real GDP growth 2.27    
    Caused by entertainment  1.87  0.043
       Explained by extensive growth entertainment 0.14  0.003
       Explained by intensive growth entertainment 1.73  0.039
Extensive growth/all growth  8   
Pure productivity effect/all growth  60   
Share effect/all growth  25   
Input transfer effect/all growth  7   
          
 
    
Sources - Entertainment data: Appendix A. 1900 and 1938 nominal GDP and real GDP-
growth: Williamson (2006). 
Note - Profits/GDP and output/GDP: the mid-year value is taken of a geometrical series 
based on the 1900 and 1938 ratios. The pure effect is the gross output/GDP share (the 
Domar weight) in 1900 times TFP-growth 1900-1938, the share effect is the same times the 
average output share 1900-1938 minus the initial share. The input transfer effect is (average 
value added / GDP) minus (entertainment input / all inputs) for 1900-1938 times the growth 
rate of inputs. Based on primal TFP-growth. Using dual TFP-growth yields a similar outcome 
(1.96 percent of GDP-growth explained by entertainment, 1.82 %-point of which intensive. 
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TABLE 9 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY TO NATIONAL TFP-GROWTH, 1900-1938 
 PRIMAL  DUAL 
 Growth Fraction  Growth Fraction
  (% p.a.) (%)  (% p.a.) (%)
National TFP growth 1.14     
TFP-growth entertainment industry  5.90   6.23  
Output/GDP  0.61    
      
National TFP-growth explained by 
entertainment  3.19   2.38
 
Sources - Appendices; Maddison (1995: 255). 
Note - National TFP-growth is the weighted average of 1870-1913 and 1913-1950. 
 
TABLE 10 
VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF OUTPUT GROWTH FOR SPECTATOR ENTERTAINMENT, AND RECREATION GOODS AND SERVICES, 1900-1938 
CATEGORY 
OUTPUT VALUED 
BY PERIOD   AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF SOURCE 
     Output Price Implied 
          TFP    
Spectator Entertainment Relative price 1900-1938 4.19 1.40  0.90  This paper; CPI 
 Price 1929-1938  
  
    
    
    
    
  
    
  
    
    
-0.47 -1.31 -3.76  NIPA
Spectator-hours 1929-1938 0.15 -1.31  -3.14  NIPA; this paper. 
 Recreation Services 
 
Price 1900-1929 5.38 3.13  2.09  Lebergott (1996)
Price 1900-1938 4.22  0.93  Lebergott (1996)
Recreation Goods 
 
Price 1900-1929 4.65 1.44 1.36  Lebergott (1996)
Price 1900-1938 3.32  0.03  Lebergott (1996)
Recreation Services and Price 1900-1929 5.27 2.35
 
 1.98  Lebergott (1996)
   Goods Price 1900-1938 3.81 0.52  Lebergott (1996)
Price
 
 1901-1938
 
4.27
 
0.27
 
 0.98
 
  Owen (1970)
  
Average 1900-1938 2.96 0.44  -0.33
Spectator entertainment Spectator-hours 1900-1938 9.19 -4.58 5.90  This paper
   as measured in this 
paper                
      
Sources - Owen (1970); Lebergott (1996); Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the United States (NIPA). 
Notes - All rates in percent per annum. Spectator entertainment was on average 57.8 percent of recreation services between 1900 and 1929, 
when Lebergott data is combined with this paper's data; spectator entertainment shrank from 65 percent to 51 of all recreation services 
expenditure percent. Spectator entertainment was on average 18.6 percent of all recreation goods and services between 1900 and 1938, when 
Owen data is combined with this paper's data; its share grew from 15 to 23 percent of all recreation goods and services expenditure. The latter 
suggest that the expenditure share of recreation goods must have dropped sharply relative to services. 
Implied TFP' speculatively assumes that inputs grew at the rate for spectator entertainment reported in table 4. 
Average: the unweighted average of spectator entertainment growth rates, recreation services growth rates and Owen's estimate of the 
recreation goods and services growth rate. 
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TABLE 11 
GROWTH OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY BY INDUSTRY GROUP, UNITED STATES, 1899-1937, IN PERCENT PER ANNUM 
RANK INDUSTRY 
38 
YEARS      30 YEARS 20 YEARS 10 YEARS 
   
1899-
1937  
1899-
1929
1909-
1937  
1899-
1919 
1909-
1929
1919-
1937  
1899-
1909
1909-
1919
1919-
1929 
1929-
1937 
1 Spectator entertainment
 
            
 
   
 
     
  
  
       
     
      
       
     
    
       
    
       
      
       
       
     
     
       
      
     
6.0  
 2 Rubber products
 
5.4  5.8 6.5 4.8 7.5 6.0  2.3 7.4 7.7 4.0 
3 Electric utilities 5.2  5.3 5.2  6.7 5.3 3.6 5.2 8.2 2.5 5.0
4 Transportation equipment 
 
4.2  5.5 5.3  4.0 7.7 4.4 1.1 7.0 8.4 -0.4 
5 Tobacco 4.1 3.5 5.1 3.0 4.6 5.2 1.2 4.9 4.4 6.3 
6 Residual Transport 3.8  2.5 5.6  0.1 4.4 8.0 -1.2 1.5 7.4 8.8 
7 Oil and Gas mining 3.7  2.5 4.6  1.1 3.2 6.6 1.3 0.9 5.5 8.1 
8 Manufactured gas 3.6 4.1 3.4 4.5 4.1 2.5 4.1 5.0 3.2 1.6
9 Printing, publishing 
 
3.3  3.5 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.9 3.0 3.7 2.6
10 Paper 2.8 2.5 3.0 1.3 2.5 4.5 2.4 0.3 4.7 4.3
11 Metals mining 2.8 2.4 3.4 1.6 3.0 4.0 1.1 2.2 3.8 4.3
12 Stone, clay, glass 2.7  2.8 2.9  1.4 3.2 4.2  2.2 0.7 5.7 2.3 
13 Petroleum, coal products 
 
2.7  2.7 3.4 -0.2 3.7 5.9 0.7 -1.0 8.6 2.7
14 Telephone 2.7  2.8 1.9  3.3 1.7 2.0 4.8 1.9 1.6 2.4
15 Local Transit
 
2.6 2.6 3.1 1.9 3.4 3.4 1.1 2.7 4.1 2.5
16 Chemicals 2.5 2.4 3.2 0.0 3.3 5.4 0.7 -0.7 7.4 3.0 
17 Fabricated metals
 
2.5 2.9 2.6 2.0 3.2 3.0 2.3 1.8 4.6 1.0
18 Apparel 2.5 2.5 3.1 1.7 3.3 3.3 0.7 2.7 4.0 2.5
19 Textiles 2.2 1.6 2.7 1.0 1.9 3.7 1.1 0.9 2.9 4.6
20 Railroads 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.8 3.4 1.9 1.7
21 Nonmetals mining 2.2  2.6 2.4 1.0 3.1 3.6 1.6 0.4 5.9 0.7
22 Miscellaneous mfg. 1.9  1.6 2.2 0.1 2.0 3.8 0.8 -0.6 4.6 2.9
23 Electric machinery
 
1.8 1.5 2.3 0.4 1.9 3.4 0.6 0.3 3.5 3.2
24 Primary metals 1.7 2.5 1.4 1.1 2.5 2.4 2.7 -0.5 5.5 -1.3
25 Machinery, on-electronic 1.7  1.5 1.9 0.8 1.8 2.6 1.0 0.7 2.9 2.3
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26 Leather products
 
       
      
    
      
       
             
 1.5  
    
 
        
       
        
        
1.7 1.2 2.2 0.3 1.7 3.2 0.1 0.5 2.9 3.6
27 Foods 1.7 1.7 2.1 -0.1 2.4 3.6 0.3 -0.4 5.3 1.5
28 Beverages 
 
1.7  -1.7 1.9  -2.4 -2.9 6.4  0.9 -5.6 -0.2 15.2 
29 Telegraph 1.6  1.5 1.7  0.1 1.5 3.3 1.5 -1.2 4.3 2.1
30 Bituminous coal mining 
 
1.6  1.8 1.8  1.5 2.1 1.8  1.2 1.8 2.4 1.0 
31 Natural gas 1.1 0.4 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.0 1.1 0.2 3.7
32 Residual sector 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.6 0.7 0.3 1.7 1.5 -0.1 0.8
33 Anthracite coal mining 
 
0.9  0.0 1.4  0.0 0.2 1.9  -0.4 0.5 0.0 4.3 
34 Furniture
 
0.8  0.9 1.4  -0.7 1.8 2.5  -0.8 -0.5 4.2 0.5 
35 Farming 0.4  0.2 0.5  -0.3 0.4 1.0  -0.2 -0.3 1.2 0.8 
36 Lumber products 0.3  0.3 0.6  -0.8 0.6 1.6  -0.4 -1.2 2.5 0.4 
Private domestic economy
  
 
Total 1.5  1.4
 
1.6
 
1.1
 
 1.8
 
 1.2
 
1.1
 
2.0
 
 1.6
 Unweighted summary statistics
  
  
 Minimum 0.3  -1.7 0.5 -2.4 -2.9 0.3  -1.2 -5.6 -0.2 -1.3
Maximum
 
5.4 5.8 6.5 6.7 7.7 8.0 5.2 8.2 8.6 15.2
Range 5.1 7.4 6.0 9.1 10.6 7.7 6.4 13.8 8.8 16.5
Average 2.4 2.2 2.8 1.4 2.6 3.5 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.1
Standard deviation 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.4 2.7 2.3 3.0
  Coefficient of variation 0.5  0.7 0.5   1.3 0.7 0.5  1.1 1.9 0.6 1.0 
      
Source - Spectator entertainment: tables 3, 4, 6, above. All else: Kendrick (1961: 136-137). 
Notes - 1899-1937 rates are arrived at by computing 1937 levels using period growth rates and then calculating 1899-1937 as if there had been 
a constant rate of growth. Spectator entertainment TFP is average of primal TFP through output calculation, through labor productivity 
calculation, and the dual TFP. Values equal to or higher than entertainment TFP-growth have been set in boldface. 
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TABLE 12 
THE GROWTH CONTRIBUTION OF CINEMA TECHNOLOGY VERSUS THAT OF GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES (GPTS) AT VARIOUS INTERVALS, 1830-2000 
GPT  L       COUNTRY INTERVAL AG GDP- GROWTH GROWTH ACCUMULATED NATIONAL  
 SHARE OF CONTRIBUTION  INTENSIVE CONTRIBUTION GROWTH 
      TFP K/L Int. TotalExt. Industry National TFP GDP
     (years) (%) (%p.a.) (%p.a.)  (%) (%)
(%-
point)  
(% 
GDP) (%Nat)
(% 
GDP)    (%) (%)
Film technology 
 
US 1900-1938 
  
25-40 0.6 5.9 3.3 92 8 0.04
 
1.4 3.8 36.1 1.14 2.27 
     
    
     
     
    
  
    
   
   
    
     
     
    
    
    
 
Railways US 1840-1890 3.1 2.8 -1.3 1.6 10.9 15.0 0.34 4.76
UK 1830-1870 2.5 5.5 14.0 52 48 0.27 5.3 38.5 13.7 0.75 2.13
UK 1870-1910
 
6.0 3.8 0.2 96 4 0.24
 
8.5 43.1 19.7 0.56 1.70
Steam UK 1850-1870 80 1.8 3.5 50 50 0.12 1.2 8.8 13.7 0.75 2.39
 1870-1910 80-120
 
2.7 1.7 64 0.1436 1.8 9.1 19.7 0.56 1.70
Steamships
 
UK 1850-1870 0.7 1.6 9.7 33 67 0.03 0.2 1.6 13.7 0.75 2.39
 1870-1910
 
3.4 1.6 4.5 50 0.10
 
50 2.1 10.7 19.7 0.56 1.70
Electricity US 1929-1948
 
40 4.6
ICT US 1973-1995 3.9 38 62 0.74 5.8 72.6 8.0 0.39 2.84
 1995-2000 6.7 41 1.8459 3.6 75.4 4.7 1.00 4.10
 2000-2006 5.8 46 1.1254 3.0 56.0 5.3 0.92 2.36
 
      
Sources - US Railways: Passell and Atack (1994: 450) based on Fogel (1962) and Fishlow (1966). UK Railways: Leunig (2006). Steam and  
steamships: Crafts (2004). US electricity data is the geometric average of 1919-1929-1941-1948 growth intervals from Kendrick (1961), as reported in 
Field (2003). ICT: Oliner, Sichel and Stiroh (2007). National TFP growth for US 1900-1938 from Maddison (1995), for the UK from Crafts (2003). US 
1973-2006 is the rate for private output as reported in Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2008). National US and UK GDP growth from Williamson (2006). 
 Notes - Lag = estimate of time between innovation and productivity impact. Int. = intensive. Ext. = extensive. %Nat = percentage of accumulated 
industry growth contribution of accumulated national intensive growth over the time interval. The TFP-growth of UK railways include time-savings, 
following Leunig (2006), which roughly double the 1830-1870 and triple the 1870-1910 growth contribution. These rates have been calculated from 
the social savings reported in Leunig (2006) using expression (7) from the text. ICT = information and communication technologies.  
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FIG. 1: Number of Actors and Actresses and Real Revenue per 
Actor/Actress in the US, 1870-1940.  
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Source - US Census, 1870-1940; United States Department of Commerce, Historical 
Statistics; Appendix B. 
Note - the 1940 data is a lower-bound estimate, because 1940 census figures for 
actors/actresses are not comparable with the 1930 census (Alba M. Edwards, 1943). In 
1930 37,993 persons were classified as actor or actress, in 1940 only 19,232. The fact 
that 1940 census classified persons by the work they were doing during one particular 
week in March, may have had particularly an effect on the number of actors/actresses. To 
arrive at a very conservative estimate, it has been assumed that, had the 1930 
classification been used, employment would only have decreased by ten percent, yielding 
a ‘comparable’ number of 34,194. It is likely that the real comparable number was very 
much lower. 
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FIG. 2: Ticket Price Versus Cumulative Ticket-Selling Capacity For 
Theatrical Entertainment Venues In Boston In 1909 ($ And Maximum 
Number Of Tickets Per Week) 
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Sources: Table 1; compiled from Boston Committee (1909), as mentioned in Garth S. 
Jowett (1974). 
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FIG. 3.—Indicators Of US Live Entertainment Production (Number Of 
Road Productions On Tour, Broadway Productions, Broadway Theatre 
Weeks And Real Expenditure), 1899-1938. 
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Sources - Bernheim (1932); McLaughlin (1974: 271-280), US Department of 
Commerce (1975). 
Notes - Road productions: this is the average of the total number of companies on tour 
in April and in December, as listed in Variety. Real expenditure: this it total consumer 
expenditure in millions of 1938 dollars, deflated by the consumer price index from B. R. 
Mitchell (1998). 
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FIG. 4.—Cobb-Douglas Production Function For US Spectator 
Entertainment, 1900 And 1938. 
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Sources - See Appendix A and B. 
Notes - The lines tangent on the Cobb-Douglas functions are the technical rate of 
substitution [(a/(1-a)*K/L]. 
The lines through the origin and through the four data points are the capital/labour 
ratios, of course. 
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APPENDIX A:  
Estimating TFP-Growth 
 
This section briefly discusses the data estimates made to calculate TFP-
growth, the estimation of factor elasticities, value of human capital and 
the effect of international trade. 
 
 
I.  Data Estimates
Since the sectoral data are at times sparse and incomplete, 
especially for 1900, approximate estimates had to be made in some 
cases. Appendix B lists in detail how these estimates were arrived at. 
Most of the 1938 data is from the US Department of Commerce, the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1977). 
The 1900 labour data are calculated from census figures, the 1900 
consumer expenditure data is arrived at by combining the US Department 
of Commerce 1909 expenditure data with John Owen’s (1970) growth 
rates on real US consumer expenditure on recreation. The 1900 price and 
capital estimates are based on expert estimates of theatre historians and 
the contemporary trade press and directories. They have been made as 
conservatively as possible, by rounding them up or down in the direction 
that would diminish TFP-growth and social savings between 1900 and 
1938, not unlike the way Robert Fogel (1964) estimated the social 
savings of US railways.  
 
 
II.  Factor Elasticities 
For motion pictures, between 1929 and 1947 the share of wages in 
national income was 0.78 on average and for other amusements and 
recreation 0.81 (table A-1). The latter category comprised far more than 
live entertainment, which was just a small share of it, but further 
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disaggregated national income data are not available. The 1930s data 
suggests a labour elasticity of about 0.80, but this value was affected 
considerably by the depression, which decreased the income share of 
capital. The shares in 1929 and 1930 and in the 1940s warrant  a 
somewhat lower estimate of long-run income-share of 0.70.  
For 1900, unfortunately no industry national income figures are 
available. If we multiply the employment with average national wages (as 
opposed to wages of entertainment workers), we arrive at a labour share 
of industry revenues of 0.66 in 1900, versus 0.52 in 1938. Given the 
estimated 1929-1947 capital costs and taking into account the effect of 
the depression it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the factor 
price of capital was 0.15 in 1900. Using 1900 benchmark estimates 
(Appendix B) - the labour share was then 0.81 in 1900. Both estimated 
suggest that the share of labour was somewhat higher in 1900 than in the 
1930s. An average share of 0.75 for the whole period  therefore does not 
seem unreasonable. 
 
 
III.  Quality of Human Capital
The over-all average quality of US labour increased substantially 
between 1900 and 1938. Education, for example, improved from 6.38 
years to 10.03 years per worker.39 Further, with the film industry’s ageing 
labour quality probably improved, because of an increasing number of 
employees who had been trained on the job. Since this is rather difficult to 
measure, the national increase in labour quality is used as a lower bound 
proxy.  
 
                                                 
39 Calculated by geometric interpolation from the benchmark years 1890, 1913 and 
1950. Maddison (1995): 37, 253. 
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TABLE A1 
NATIONAL INCOME GENERATED BY THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY AND 
‘AMUSEMENTS AND RECREATION’ AND FACTOR INCOME SHARES 
Year  Compensation of   Corporate Other capital   L/NI 
 NI Employees Capital  profits income  
 MOTION PICTURES 
1929 440 310 130  59 71  0.70
1930 438 313 125  51 74  0.71
1931 361 307 54  2 52  0.85
1932 194 241 -47  -83 36  1.24
1933 210 227 -17  -40 23  1.08
1934 283 253 30  2 28  0.89
1935 329 282 47  13 34  0.86
1936 391 317 74  29 45  0.81
1937 437 360 77  33 44  0.82
1938 426 346 80  39 41  0.81
1939 434 353 81  41 40  0.81
1940 448 353 95  51 44  0.79
1941 513 386 127  78 49  0.75
1942 652 425 227  155 72  0.65
1943 830 477 353  253 100  0.57
1944 882 531 351  246 105  0.60
1945 929 573 356  238 118  0.62
1946 1129 703 426  304 122  0.62
1947 1046 719 327  224 103  0.69
Average        0.78
 AMUSEMENTS AND RECREATION —  EXCEPT MOTION PICTURES 
1929 379 323 56  1 55  0.85
1930 336 299 37  -9 46  0.89
1931 268 256 12  -20 32  0.96
1932 177 191 -14  -30 16  1.08
1933 154 161 -7  -23 16  1.05
1934 197 176 21  -9 30  0.89
1935 211 180 31  -5 36  0.85
1936 253 205 48  2 46  0.81
1937 305 239 66  5 61  0.78
1938 266 216 50  2 48  0.81
1939 288 230 58  4 54  0.80
1940 310 246 64  9 55  0.79
1941 368 270 98  18 80  0.73
1942 388 281 107  18 89  0.72
1943 436 291 145  34 111  0.67
1944 507 337 170  42 128  0.66
1945 613 384 229  71 158  0.63
1946 816 524 292  93 199  0.64
1947 797 566 231  64 167  0.71
Average              0.81
Source - Bureau of Economic Analysis 1977. 
Notes - NI = national income. Other capital income = proprietors' income, rental 
income, net interest.  L/NI = share of wages in national income. All other values in 
millions of current dollars.
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IV.  International Trade
The net dollar revenues from US films abroad should be included in 
the national income, as calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Industry output, however, has been calculated by dividing domestic 
revenues by price. It is difficult to do this for export revenues, because 
precise data lack and also because ticket prices varied substantially 
across the world. If one assumes that about a third of US box office 
revenue went to distributors and one uses the expert ballpark estimate 
that the Hollywood studios’ foreign earnings were about one third to one 
quarter of domestic revenues, then foreign income in 1938 would be 
about 1/9th to 1/12th of domestic expenditure, between $55 and $74 
million.  
The final output generated abroad, however, uses mainly foreign 
labour and capital and these are not included in the US figures. The only 
US share would be those from employees working in film production, 
about 33,000 in 1938, and those in international distribution, relatively 
negligible. Given the number of assumptions to be made, it seems most 
appropriate to ignore the foreign issue. Given that, for US producers, 
those foreign spectator-hours had marginal costs approaching zero, that 
the US economy did not consume that additional output, and given that 
that the dollars received for it were national income, it does not seem 
unreasonable to exclude foreign output. It will certainly make our TFP-
estimate more conservative. 
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APPENDIX B:  
Data Used for the Estimates40
 
This appendix provides the sources for the estimates on labour, capital 
and output. Since the available data are sparse, approximate estimates 
had to be made in some cases. The estimates have been made 
transparent and replicable by stating all the steps. They also have been 
made as ‘conservative’ as possible; they have been rounded up or 
rounded down in the direction that would diminish overall TFP growth 
between 1900 and 1938. For 1900 estimates for prices, labour and capital 
will have a downward bias, those for output an upward bias and vice-
versa for 1938. 
 Table B-1 gives an overview of all the data used and estimates 
made. 
 
 
I.  Entertainment in 1900 
A. Labour in 1900 
1. The US census lists 57,777 persons classified under 
entertainment. These are only management and creative inputs, 
not the practical workers that worked in the entertainment industry. 
2. In the 1910 census, which contains a disaggregated 
breakdown of these categories, 15.89 percent of the persons above 
were listed under classifications that largely involve non-theatrical 
entertainment, and which were not present in the 1900 census. It is 
simply assumed that this percentage was the same in 1900, we 
arriving at  0.8411 x 57,777 = 48,596 persons classified under 
entertainment. 
3. In 1930, for the first time, both practical workers classified in 
the census under entertainment (Census of Population, 1930) and 
                                                 
40 This paper’s estimates differ in five respects from those of Gerben Bakker (2004): 
the current paper takes into account the changes in hours worked; it has better price 
estimates based on more precise data; it has better capital data; and, finally, it is more 
accurate in the data on total consumer expenditure and in the size of the total 
entertainment labour force in 1938. 
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practical workers working in entertainment but classified in the 
census under other industries (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
1977) are available. Therefore this year will be used as a 
benchmark year. The census contained 203,251 persons working 
in spectator entertainment (249,177 – 6,097 aviators – 10,718 
‘keepers of pleasure resorts, race tracks etc.’ – 29,129 ‘keepers of 
billiard rooms, dance halls, skating rinks etc.’ = 203,251 persons). 
31.1 percent of these had practical occupations. If we make the 
bold assumption that this percentage was the same in 1900, we 
arrive at (57,777/68.9)*100 = 70,532 persons working in the 
industry in 1900. 
4. Data on workers classified in other industries but working for 
the entertainment industry are only available from 1930. Using the 
same method as will be used to calculate 1938 labour (see below), 
we arrive at 71,122 live entertainment fte in 1930, making a total of 
entertainment fte of 153,000 for film and 71,122 = 224,122 fte, 
suggesting that 20,871 persons, or 10.3 percent of the census total, 
were classified under non-entertainment occupations. Assuming 
that this percentage was the same in 1900, we arrive at 1.1026 * 
70,532 = 77,774 persons working in the entertainment industry in 
1900. 
5. This is a rough estimate, and sources lack to make a more 
precise estimate. Yet, the directions and the magnitude of the 
findings are not that sensitive for an estimation error of say plus or 
minus 10,000 persons (see text)
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TABLE B1 
PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS FOR ENTERTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1938 
    LIVE + FILM  DISAGGREGATED 
         
Live  
technology   
Film
technology
Labour (hours)       
 1900   200,212,948  200,212,948   
 1938   360,296,080  52,994,324  307,301,756
Capital ($)        
 1900   176  176   
 1938   1,086  137  949
Sold output (million sh)       
 1900   249  249   
 1938   7,038  155  6,883
Expenditure (million 1938$)       
 1900   151  151   
 1938   721  58  663
Price (1938$)        
 1900   0.608  0.608   
 1938   0.102  0.374  0.096
Labour productivity (sh/hour))       
 1900   1.24  1.24   
 1938   19.53  2.92  22.40
Capital productivity (sh per 1000$)       
 1900   1,412  1,412  
 1938   6,479  1,131  7,251
Labour costs ($/hour)     
 1900   0.28  0.28  0.28
 1938   1.09  0.75  1.15
Capital Costs ($ per $ of K)     
 1900   0.1268  0.1268  0.1268
 1938   0.0963  0.0341  0.1052
Capital factor income in $million     
 1900   17.65  17.65  
 1938   74.65  2.75  71.91
Labour factor income (wage bill)     
 1900   55.81  55.81  
 1938   394.09  40  354
Capital consumption     
 1900   4.73  4.73  
 1938   29.93  1.93  28.00
Capital/(hour)      
 1900   0.9  0.9  
 1938   3.0  2.6  3.1
Population (millions)      
 1900   76  76  76
 1938   130  130  130
Output/capita (sh)      
 1900   3.3  3.3  0.0
 1938   54.2  1.2  53.0
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Expenditure/capita 
(1938 $)      
 1900   2.0  2.0  0.0
  1938    5.6   0.4   5.1
 
Sources - Appendix; education: Maddison (1995). 
Note - All amounts at 1938 prices;  sh = spectator-hour (see text). Labour productivity 
(in spectator-hours per hour worked) is uncorrected for increases in labour quality. 
 
6. Since data on full time and part-time proportions is lacking for 
1900, the 1938 ratio of fte over the total number of employees, 
0.8762, has been used to convert these persons into ftes, arriving 
at 68,146 fte. 
7. As industry-specific working hours are lacking, these persons 
have been multiplied by the average annual working hours (2938) 
taken from Huberman and Minns (2007), to arrive at a grand total 
of 200.2 million hours. 
 
B. Wages in 1900 
For 1900, the national average wages (from Dewhurst, 1955) have 
been used, as reliable industry wages series are not available.  
 
C. Consumer Expenditure in 1900 
1. Entertainment expenditure in 1909 was $167 million (US 
Department of Commerce, 1975) which amounts $260.937 million 
in 1938 dollars, using the consumer price deflators in Mitchell 
(1998). All amounts that follow are changed into 1938 dollars using 
these same deflators.  
2. This figure is back-projected to 1901 by using Owen’s growth 
rates for real total consumer expenditure for 1906-1913 (7.99 
percent) and 1901-1906 (5.85 percent) (Owen, 1970), yielding an 
expenditure of $155.930 million in 1901. 
3. This figure is then further back-projected by assuming 1900-
1901 had at least half the growth rate (to make the estimate more 
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4. conservative) as 1901-1906, yielding 1900 expenditure of 
$151.499 million (in 1938 dollars). 
5. A rough cross-check is made by taking the average 
household expenditure on ‘amusements and vacations’ from the 
US Commissioner of Labor Survey (as reported in Bakker, 2001). 
This was 1.1 percent. It is then assumed that half of this, 0.55 
percent, was spent on spectator entertainment. Using the 
1917/1919 expenditure on spectator entertainment (Bakker, 2001), 
of 0.63 percent, it is tentatively assumed that in 1900, on average 
0.59 percent of labour income was spent on spectator 
entertainment.  If we take the share of labour income in national 
income in 1900 to be 0.54 (Rosenbloom, 2005), we arrive at 
consumer expenditure on spectator entertainment in 1900 of $66 
million, which is $112 million dollars of 1938. This rough estimate 
confirms that estimate (3) is in the right ballpark, but about a 
quarter lower, and thus may lead to underestimating productivity 
growth. 
6. Since (3) is the more careful estimate, and also the more 
conservative one (i.e. the one that would tend to over-estimate 
productivity in 1900 and thus lower the TFP-estimate, estimate (3) 
is taken. 
 
D. Prices in 1900 
1. It is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of entertainment 
prices in 1900, but one for high-quality live entertainment in 1913 is 
$2 per ticket (Poggi, 1968: 71). In the 1900s, also lower priced live 
entertainment existed and cheaper tickets. Robert C. Allen (1980: 
296), for example, found that standing place tickets for vaudeville 
ranged from 15 to 50 cents,  while Felicia Hardison Londré and 
Daniel J. Watermeier (1998: 265) describe how low-priced resident 
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stock theatre companies emerged between 1900 and 1920, whose 
prices usually varied between ten and thirty cents, and rarely 
exceeded 75 cents. Glen Hughes (1951: 305) writes how an early 
vaudeville theatre in the 1880s charged 10 cents for standing 
places and 15 cents for seats. Using rough estimates like these, 
and assuming ticket prices rose in line with inflation during the 
1900s, we arrive at an average price of $1.25 for the most 
expensive live entertainment, $0.35 for the entertainment in 
between, and $0.20 for the cheapest live entertainment in 1900. 
These are deliberately lower bound estimates, to make our 
calculation more conservative. 
2. It is then assumed that in the most expensive places, a 
performance lasted 2.5 hours, in the intermediate places 2 hours, 
and in the cheapest places 1.5 hours. Combining this with (1) yields 
average prices per spectator-hour of 50, 17.50 and 13.33 cents, 
respectively. 
3. Given that no systematic price data is available, an estimate 
has to be made. It is assumed that in 1900, about half of all tickets 
sold was for ‘first-class’ live entertainment. Using contemporary 
sources, Londré and Watermeier (1998: 185) identify 1,700 
theatres nation wide available for touring and about 1,000 unlisted 
theatres. If it is assumed that the unlisted theatres were of a lower 
quality and charged lower admission prices, this would yield a ratio 
of 63 percent. To keep our estimate conservative, we set the ratio 
at fifty percent, and assume that this ratio was the same for the 
vaudeville, burlesque, and others theatrical entertainments. We 
then simply assume that another 25 percent of tickets were for 
intermediate entertainment, and another 25 for the cheapest form 
of entertainment. 
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4. Correcting for differences in output, the weight of the three 
forms of entertainment becomes then 58.82 percent 
(0.5*2.5/(0.5*2.5+0.25*2+0.25*1.5)), 23.53 percent and 17.65 
percent respectively. 
5. Combining (2) and (4) we arrive at an average price per 
spectator-hour in 1900 of (0.5882*50) + (0.2353*17.50) + 
(0.1765*13.33) = 35.88 cents in 1900 prices. This amounts to 60.81 
cents in 1938 dollars. 
6. Particularly good data on spectator entertainment prices and 
quantities for the period when cinemas already were omnipresent 
enables us to check whether the estimate above is roughly in the 
right ballpark. The data is for Boston in 1909, is reported in Gart S. 
Jowett (1974), and is based on an investigation by the Boston 
Committee on Amusements (see also table 1 and figure 2 in the 
main text). It contains ticket prices and estimated ticket-selling 
capacities for each category of spectator entertainment, from 
opera, at $2.00 a ticket to cinema, at $0.10 a ticket. If we ignore the 
two lowest priced categories, motion picture theatres (52 percent of 
total capacity) and theatres showing ‘vaudeville and motion 
pictures’ (10 percent of total capacity, price $0.15), we arrive at 
weights of 49 percent for high-priced entertainment (opera, first-
class and popular theatre), 23 percent for medium-priced 
entertainment (‘stock houses’ and ‘vaudeville houses’) and 28 
percent for low-priced entertainment (‘burlesque houses’), with 
average ticket prices of $1.10, $0.58 and $0.25, yielding an 
average ticket price of 76.25 cents and an average duration (using 
the durations mentioned in (4) above) of 2.105 hours. This results 
in an average current ticket price of 35.27 cents. This price is 
nearly equal to the current 1900 price of 35.88 cents. In real terms, 
the price is somewhat lower, 53.43 cents of 1938. If both our 
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estimates would be entirely accurate (a big if) then this would 
suggest that during the 1900s, the live entertainment price 
decreased with 1.43 percent per annum relative to all other prices, 
leaving the nominal price unchanged. This does not seem 
unreasonable, given the increasing competition of cinema from 
1905 onwards. Given that by 1909, about three to four years after 
the first cinemas emerged, 52 percent of Boston capacity existed of 
cinemas, an average price of 35.27 cents in the face of strong 
cinema competition suggests that the price could have been far 
higher in 1900. 
7. Although the data analyzed under (6) suggests that our 1900 
price estimate reported under (5) may be somewhat on the low 
side, the price estimate under (5), of 35.88 cents, or 60.81 cents in 
1938 dollars is kept, to keep the estimate of TFP-growth 
conservative. 
 
E. Capital in 1900 
1. Exact data on capital invested in the entertainment industry in 
1900 is not available. The number of theatres was estimated to be 
2,700 in 1905; 1,700 first-class listed theatres and about 1,000 
others (Londré and Watermeier, 1998). A different estimate for 
1910 arrived at 1,520 first-class listed theatres (Bernheim 1932). It 
is thus estimated that in 1905 the total number was 2,700 and that 
on top of this, 1,000 vaudeville theatres existed, and 1,000 other 
entertainment venues, yielding a total of 4,700. It is then assumed 
that between 1900 and 1905 the number of venues grew at the rate 
of the real expenditure on recreation (5.58 percent per annum) 
found by Owen (1970). This yields 3,537 venues in 1900. 
2. Because no systematic data is available, based on anecdotal 
historical construction costs and acquisition data for individual 
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theatres from the theatre history literature (see bibliography) a 
rough and ready ballpark estimate was made that the capital 
needed to build an average theatre in 1900 was about $35,000. 
3. It is assumed capital will depreciate in fifty years and that in 
1900, the average age of an entertainment venue was ten years, 
given the boom in entertainment expenditure towards the end of 
the 19th century. This yields an average depreciated invested 
capital per theatre of $28,000, and a total invested capital of 
$99.036 million, amounting to $176 million in 1938 dollars (using 
the GDP-deflator from Williamson (2006)). 
 
F. Cost of Capital in 1900 
1. This is calculated as (capital factor income + capital 
consumption)/(capital stock). 
2. Since no reliable industry data on capital income exist, an 
estimate had to be made; capital income been set at ten percent of 
stock, slightly higher as in 1938, given the effect of the depression, 
and capital consumption at the same percentage as in 1938 (2.68 
percent of stock). This yields a cost of capital of 0.1268, or $17.65 
million in 1938 dollars. 
 
II.  Entertainment in 1938
A. Labour in 1938 
Cinema: 
Employment was 171,000 full-time employment equivalent (fte). In 
addition, there were 7,000 self-employed.(Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 1977: 206). The latter have been converted to fte using 
the ratio of fte/(full-time and part-time employees) for the 
employees and then assuming that that these self-employed 
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worked for 5/8 of their time in entertainment, yielding a total of 
175,001 fte. 
 
Cinema wages: 
From same source as above (Bureau of  Economic Analysis 1977: 
206) the total compensation paid was $354 million. 
 
Live entertainment 
1. In Amusements and Recreation employment was 163,000 
full-time employment equivalent (fte). In addition, there were 49,000 
self-employed.(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1977: 206). The 
latter have been converted to fte using the ratio of fte/(full-time and 
part-time employees) for the employees, and assuming they 
worked for 5/8 in entertainment, yielding 24,835 fte self-employed 
and a total of 187,835 fte (table B-2).
 64
TABLE B2 
ENTERTAINMENT EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION, 1938 
    
Employees Self-  
employed 
Total
 FILM 
Full-time and part-time 
employees  187,000 7,000 194,000
Fte  171,000 4,001 175,001
Total wages and salaries  332,082,000 7,769,298 339,851,298
Total compensation of employees 346,000,000 8,094,920 354,094,920
Wages and salary/fte  1,942 1,942 1,942
Total compensation/fte  2,023 2,023 2,023
Wages and salary/employee  1,776 1,776 1,752
Total compensation/employee  1,850 1,850 1,825
 AMUSEMENTS AND RECREATION 
Full-time and part-time 
employees  201,000 49,000 250,000
Fte  163,000 24,835 187,835
Total wages and salaries  207,010,000 31,540,703 238,550,703
Total compensation of employees 216,000,000 32,910,448 248,910,448
Wages and salary/fte  1,270 1,270 1,270
Total compensation/fte  1,325 1,325 1,325
Wages and salary/employee  1,030 1,030 954
Total compensation/employee  1,075 1,075 996
 LIVE 
Full-time and part-time 
employees  32,294 7,873 40,166
Fte  26,188 3,990 30,179
Total wages and salaries  33,259,224 5,067,481 38,326,706
Total compensation of employees 34,703,601 5,287,551 39,991,152
Wages and salary/fte  1,270 1,270 1,270
Total compensation/fte  1,325 1,325 1,325
Wages and salary/employee  1,030 1,030 954
Total compensation/employee  1,075 1,075 996
 FILM + LIVE 
Full-time and part-time 
employees  219,294 14,873 234,166
Fte  197,188 7,991 205,179
Total wages and salaries  365,341,224 14,804,995 380,146,219
Total compensation of employees 380,703,601 15,427,536 396,131,137
Wages and salary/fte  1,853 1,853 1,853
Total compensation/fte  1,931 1,931 1,931
Wages and salary/employee  1,666 1,666 1,623
Total compensation/employee   1,736 1,736 1,692
      
Source - United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (1977). 
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2. The problem arises that this figure aggregates several other 
activities with live entertainment and that disaggregated figures are 
not available. We can therefore only make a rough estimate of the 
number of people working in live entertainment. 
3. Using the disaggregated consumer expenditure figures for 
1938, including spectator sports, clubs, and commercial participant 
entertainment - the latter consisting of billiard parlours, bowling 
alleys, dancing, riding, shooting, skating, and swimming places; 
amusement devices and parks; golf courses; sightseeing buses 
and guides; and private flying operations - (U.S. Bureau, 1977: 
337), and not weighing clubs and fraternities, we arrive at an upper 
bound estimate of live entertainment revenue share in 
‘Amusements and Recreation’ of 58/361 = 16.07 percent. 
Assuming that live entertainment has the same revenue/labour 
ratio as other recreation, we arrive at 30,179 fte. This figure is not 
out of line with the 1930 and 1940 census figures, when adjusted 
for the pronounced dip in live entertainment expenditure during the 
1930s. It suggests that cinema has over twice as much revenue per 
fte as cinema, which does not seem entirely implausible. 
 
Live wages: 
From same source as above: only available at the level of 
‘Amusements and Recreation’ as a whole; $1,325 per annum per 
fte. For legitimate theatre, wages may have been substantially 
higher than those of cinema (if we exclude film production). 
Detailed minimum wage data from the League of New York 
Theatres (Wharton 1961) report weekly wages from about ten 
dollars for an usher to $100 for house managers and $150 to 
advance agents. The data suggests that a $1325 average annual 
compensation per fte is not unrealistic. 
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Cinema + live 
Total employment then was 205,179 fte (table B-2). 
8. As industry-specific working hours are lacking, these persons 
have been multiplied by the average annual working hours (1756) 
taken from Huberman and Minns (2007), to arrive at a grand total 
of 360.3 million hours. 
 
B.  Consumer Expenditure in 1938 
This was $721 million, $663 million for cinema and $58 million for 
other spectator entertainment (US Department of Commerce 1975: 
854-855).  
 
C.  Prices in 1938 
Cinema: 
1. According to the Film Daily Yearbook, in 1938 the average 
price of a cinema ticket was 23 cents (as quoted in Harold L. Vogel, 
2004: 500). However, this estimate is not very precise (making the 
actual price vary between 22.5 and 23.5 cents, and it is unclear 
how it is arrived at). 
2. More careful estimates for 1935 and 1939 prices have been 
made by Michael Conant (1960: 4), using data from the 
Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. He 
arrives at nominal prices of 24.9 cents in 1935 and 26.5 cents in 
1939, which translate into 25.67 and 26.768 constant cents of 
1938. Using the 1935-1939 real growth rate we arrive at an 
average price of 26.489 cents in 1938. This price is taken as it is 
the most reliable and highest (most conservative) estimate. 
3. The average duration of a cinema performance is taken to be 
2 hours and 45 minutes, which is a conservative estimate, as most 
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US theatres showed double features and of course shorts. This 
yields an average price per spectator-hour of 9.632 cents. 
 
Live: 
1. Since the total number of live entertainment admissions is not 
given with the expenditure data, the average price cannot be 
calculated exactly. Therefore, an estimate of the average price is 
being made on information from the trade press. 
2. For Broadway, reliable time series of top-ticket average price 
are available from 1926-1965, for both ‘straight shows’ and 
musicals (Moore, 1968: 151). In 1938, they were $3.22 and $4.16 
respectively. 
3. From 1949 onwards, also time-series on the average 
Broadway ticket prices are available (Moore, 1968: 151). Over this 
period, the range of the ratio top/average price for straight shows 
and musicals are 1.16-1.52 and 1.18-1.47, respectively. To keep 
the price estimate conservative, here the highest ratios are used to 
calculate average Broadway ticket prices for 1938. This yields 
$2.12 and $2.83 as average ticket prices. To make the estimate 
even more cautious, the average price for musicals is discarded. 
4. It is then assumed that the average ticket price of all other 
live entertainment in the US was a third of the Broadway ticket 
price, 0.33 * 2.12 = $0.70, which is again conservatively low. 
5. It then is assumed Broadway tickets accounted for 1/10 of all 
ticket sales in the US and other live entertainment for 9/10. 
(“Broadway” is here taken to represent most metropolitan 
entertainment, such as in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, etc.). This 
yields an average ticket price for live entertainment of $0.842. 
 68
6. It is then assumed that a live performance lasted 2 hours and 
15 minutes on average, which yields an average price of $0.3742 
per spectator-hour. 
 
Cinema and Live 
1. Total spectator-hours sold for cinema were 
663,000,000/0.09632 = 6883.3 million, and for live entertainment 
58,000,000/0.3742 = 155 million, making a total of 7038.3 million. 
The average price then, is (0.9780*$0.09632)+(0.0220*$0.3742)= 
$0.10244 per spectator-hour. 
 
D.  Capital in 1938 
1. In a detailed study William I. Greenwald (1950: 228) 
calculated capital value for 1944 based on statistics of the US 
Bureau of Internal Revenue. He arrives at $1552 million invested in 
the motion picture industry, and $303 million invested in other live 
entertainment. 
2. Because of the depression, in 1938 the industry was running 
below capacity. If we assume that one quarter of the growth rate in 
motion picture and live entertainment admissions between 1938 
and 1944 (6.1 and 13.3 percent annually, respectively) was 
accommodated by improved capacity utilization, we arrive at 1938 
capital of $949.3 million for motion pictures and $136.9 million for 
live entertainment, yielding a grand total of $1086 million, all in 
1938 dollars. 
3. No capital data is available for the self-employed, which 
made up 2.3 percent of all fte in film and 15.2 percent in 
amusements and recreation, of which live entertainment was part. 
Given the absence of data also for 1900, it is considered best to 
ignore this potential capital. If it was proportionately the same in 
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1900 and 1938 it would not affect the findings. It is not expected 
that any major shift in this small category could affect this paper’s 
findings.  
 
E.  Cost of Capital in 1938 
1. This is calculated as (capital factor income + capital 
consumption)/(capital stock).  
2. To calculate the cost of capital, proprietors’ income, rental 
income, corporate profits, net interest is calculated from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (1977). From national income are subtracted 
total compensation paid to employees and estimated (implicit) 
compensation paid for their own employment by the self-employed. 
The latter has been estimated using the estimated number of self-
employed fte, times the average industry compensation per fte. 
Live entertainment national income had to be estimated from the 
aggregate Amusements and Recreation national income using the 
method in A above, where the estimated share of live 
entertainment in all amusements and recreation expenditure is 
used. 
3. The above method results in $71.9 million + $2.7 million for 
live = $74.4 million dollars. 
4. To this is added the capital consumption, $28.0 + $1.9 
million, to arrive at a total cost of capital of 104.6 million, or 9.63 
percent of the capital stock (for film this was 10.52 percent, for live 
3.41 percent (cents per dollar of capital)). 
5. To check this finding, the resulting 1938 value for the motion 
picture industry, 10.01 percent, is compared to the value in 1937, 
reported in a contemporary work (Huettig, 1944: 100, which bases 
itself on a survey by the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
This value was 10.67 percent. The two values are close enough to 
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make the value estimated above credible. Based on an analysis 
SEC and Bureau of Internal Revenue surveys, Huettig also notes 
that the motion picture industry in 1937 was the tenth most 
profitable US industry in terms of return on investment, and the 45th 
most profitable industry in terms of the absolute dollar amount of 
profits (Huettig, 1944: 56-57, 99-101).  
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